Including a counter in each UDP packet does not make ECB mode equivalent to CTR mode.
Let's assume the counter is at the start of the packet. An AES block is 16 bytes, so the counter ensures the first 16 bytes of ciphertext are unique across packets. But any patterns in the remainder of the packet are preserved, within and across packets.
You've created a false dichotomy between an absolute right to free speech and absolute disregard for free speech.
There's a third possibility, which is to believe that freedom of speech is an important right, but not an absolute right that trumps all others.
One version of this belief says that freedom of speech is useful to society because it allows dissenting views to be resolved through debate rather than violent conflict. It would be reasonable to argue that speech that incites or promotes violent conflict doesn't qualify for protection on these grounds.
Another version of this belief says that freedom of speech is just, because society should only intrude on an individual's freedom (e.g. by preventing them from speaking) when the exercise of that freedom threatens another individual's freedom. Again, speech that incites or promotes intruding on other people's freedom, to an extent greater than the intrusion caused by preventing the speech, could reasonably be excluded from protection on these grounds.
It's obvious how either of these beliefs about free speech would be compatible with censoring speech that promotes violence or the overthrow of democracy, while at the same time being compatible with objecting to the censorship of other speech.
But here's where it gets interesting for me. From the point of view of the Chinese Communist Party, the demonstrators in Hong Kong are threatening the stability of a society that within living memory has seen periods of instability that killed millions. From their point of view, the demonstrators are acting violently and putting millions of lives at risk.
I wouldn't personally argue that speaking out in favour of the demonstrators is promoting violence. But the line is less clear than I'd like.
"the right of people to express their opinions publicly without governmental interference, subject to the laws against libel, incitement to violence or rebellion, etc."
The diagrams of centralised, decentralised and distributed networks from his 1963 RAND paper "Introduction to Distributed Communications" will be familiar to many.
As I've said previously: the next time someone asks "who could have predicted the downsides of the Internet?", you can tell them: the guy who invented it, in the 1960s.
A salad with some pan-fried halloumi cheese and pine nuts is quick and satisfying, though probably too salty to eat every day. Halloumi works as a meat substitute in a lot of recipes.
Lentils and onions over rice will fill you up, but it's certainly less fun than a steak.
Stir fries are quick, fun to cook and satisfying. Slice a couple of hard-boiled eggs, add soy sauce and sesame seeds, and serve over the stir-fried veg.
I think the GP intended "the rest of Spain" to mean "Spain excluding Barcelona", rather than "Spain excluding Portugal". But I read it as "Spain excluding Portugal" the first time too.
Let's assume these figures are useful as a first approximation of the number of hours of laptop usage per laptop owner in 2018. I'm not saying it's a perfect match, just that they're likely to be better than figures you or I would pull out of the air.
Taking the centre of each band, assuming "more than 10 hours" means "10 to 16 hours", and excluding the "no computers" band, gives a mean of 4.3 hours per day. So each laptop is active roughly 18% of the time.
That's more than I expected, but it still means you're going to need a lot of people to pin the content before you have a 99% chance of at least one copy being online at any given time.
Edit: As far as I can tell, with 18% uptime you need 15 copies for 99% reliability (assuming no correlation between the online times of the various copies, which is optimistic - in reality there will be strong daily and weekly cycles).
If I understand right, GP's saying we need proof that the nodes storing the data are collectively storing multiple copies (as opposed to being sybil identities for a single node that's getting paid multiple times for storing a single copy).
GP suggests making each copy unique. It seems to me that the difficult part is making it cheap for uploaders, verifiers and downloaders to translate between the original data and the various unique copies, without also making it cheap for storers to do so (otherwise they could just store the original data and generate parts of the copies on the fly when challenged).
A similar problem arises in memory-hard functions used for password hashing, such as scrypt and Argon2. Those functions are designed to ensure that you have to use a large amount of memory to compute the function - or at least, to ensure that a space/time tradeoff that allows you to use a smaller amount of memory is very expensive. I wonder if techniques from memory-hard functions could be useful in proof of (unique) storage?
Let's assume the counter is at the start of the packet. An AES block is 16 bytes, so the counter ensures the first 16 bytes of ciphertext are unique across packets. But any patterns in the remainder of the packet are preserved, within and across packets.