Well, blogging about how it's important can certainly give insight to others about the age of your credentials, just in case repeatedly shouting "Get off my lawn!" didn't suffice.
How does that work? Is there a VSCode extension that works with all of them? I’ve only used the Claude Code extension for VSCode and would prefer something like that.
When dealing with memory in C defaulting to malloc or some opaque structure behind it is unless you just want to allocate and forget it for some one off program that frees memory on proc exit seems bad to me now. For any kind of sophisticated system or module you almost always want to write your own variety of slab, arena, pool, bump whatever it may be allocator.
What we need is a capabilities based security system. It could write all the python, asm, whatever it wants and it wouldn't matter at all if it was never given a reference to use something it shouldn't.
Unix permissions is not a capability system though. Capabilities are more like "here is a file descriptor pointing to a directory, you are not capable of referring to anything outside it". So closer to chroot, except you can have several such directory references at the same time.
You can always narrow down a capability (get a new capability pointing to a subdirectory or file, or remove the writing capability so it is read only) but never make it more broad.
In a system designed for this it will be used for everything, not just file system. You might have capabilities related to network connections, or IPC to other processes, etc. The latter is especially attractive in microkernel based OSes. (Speaking of which, Redox OS seems to be experimenting with this, just saw an article today about that.)
I have been putting my agents on their own, restricted OS-level user accounts for a while. It works really well for everything I do.
Admittedly, there’s a little more friction and agent confusion sometimes with this setup, but it’s worth the benefit of having zero worries about permissions and security.
There exist restricted Shells. But honestly, I don't feel capable of assessing all attack vectors and security measures in sufficient detail. For example, do the rbash restrictions also apply when Python is called with it? Or can the agent somehow bypass rbash to call Python?
Enabling Claude Code's sandbox (as OP suggested) does exactly that. It's a system-level filesystem sandbox that only permits access to specified locations for any process, including the python interpreter.
If you disallow it from just writing Python scripts to bypass its defined environment at its core system training why would this matter? I would lockdown its path anything that tries to call Python should require the end-user to approve and see the raw script before they do.
You can always restrict yourself to a subset of C++ that takes advantage of RAII (resource handling is extremely painful in C), and get performance benefits like move semantics, without the insanely complex stuff.
I love C, but C++ has worthwhile advantages even if you heavily restrict which features you use.
I do this and my C++ is really like python to code in.
But, if you work in a team, there will always be a bunch of people who come in and start using all sorts of exotic shit for their resume or hobby interest.
No offense intended to your perspective, but I do find it a little amusing that C++23, which was generally considered a disappointingly small update due to COVID complications, was the breaking point in complexity.
Exactly like someone else here said, in retrospect he probably just wishes he had chosen a more permissive license now that he has forever received the credit and wants to have his cake and eat it too.
Replace GPL in his sentence with something anti-AI and think of back in time when Carmack did that, it's exactly the same situation now except he's in a much more favorable position to make that stance, it's ironic if he can't see that most of us are on the other side of that fence with AI right now.
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