> This implies discarding how people feel about subjects, because feelings are inherently subjective.
If you believe, as I do, that the nature of reality is an objective matter, and people's subjective feelings are part of this objective reality, then the following are true:
- That certain people feel a certain way is an objective matter.
- Why people feel a certain way is also an objective matter.
Both of these things can be either very difficult or impossible to determine (at present at least), but that's a separate issue - it's epistemological not ontological.
If you believe, as I do, that the nature of reality is an objective matter, and people's subjective feelings are part of this objective reality, then the following are true:
- That certain people feel a certain way is an objective matter.
- Why people feel a certain way is also an objective matter.
Both of these things can be either very difficult or impossible to determine (at present at least), but that's a separate issue - it's epistemological not ontological.