The Big Law model (in which I worked for four years some time back and with which I have dealt repeatedly over the years from one angle or another) depends heavily on highly leveraged relationships within the firm, typically with something like a 1 to 3 ratio between the equity partners and the young associates who do the bulk of the actual hourly billing.
It also depends on the firm's having the capacity to do highly sophisticated legal work while consistently adhering to standards of excellence.
Finally, it depends upon the firm's ability to induce the associates to adhere to wildly oppressive work hours as part of their normal schedule, such that, for example, when FB broadened its disclosure of user information there came popping out a whole series of attorneys who had (in the former cover of darkness) described themselves as "Slaves of xxx," or some variation thereof (which FB automatically designated as company names).
These firms will pay the associates anywhere from $165K/yr to start up to the high $200s, often with large bonuses tacked on to the base salary.
Why? Because it is basically a vast money-making machine for the partners who lead and manage those firms and who pull in multi-million dollar annual incomes. And the key to it is to have lots of talented bodies consistently pulling all-nighters on major pieces of litigation and major deals that such firms handle. Thus, whenever you read about a headline deal ("Skype to offer shares in IPO at $1B valuation"), you can assume that there is a small legal army at work in the background doing an orgy of billing.
For their part, the associates toil and slave in such systems for as much as 8 to 10 years in hopes of making partner so that they can one day be on the receiving end of this money-making machine.
This system works well only if highly talented young attorneys can consistently be recruited to handle the vast bulk of the billable hours involved in such work. Thus, the most precious asset belonging to such firms is precisely this pool of young talent, and they will pay dearly to get it. What is more, such associates are paid in lockstep, meaning that if one of these large firms "adjusts," the others will be quick to follow. For a nearly unbroken period over the past 25 years, those adjustments have consistently been upward. The craziness peaked in the bubble years of the late 1990s, during which the associates themselves set up "greedy associates" websites and compared notes on every dollar paid and every perk provided by their respective firms. Of course, if any firm began to be seen as out of step with what these young lawyers came to see as their entirely legitimate demands, this would be suicide for the firm involved because the top talent would no longer go there. Thus, one saw the spectacle of the most elite law partners in the nation cravenly bowing and scraping to green new grads, all for the purpose of continuing to curry favor with them for recruiting purposes.
It goes without saying, then, that the firms would easily shell out for the sorts of things described in this piece - for expensive and luxurious flights, hotel stays, cab fares, dinners out, etc. It was all part of the game, and not a particularly costly part given what the firms would ultimately derive from this labor-pool asset within their business models. During their summer internships, they would be wined and dined as law students and would be repeatedly told what a great place to work the firm was. Once recruited as associates after graduation, they were introduced to the "slave system" in spades, and the naive perceptions they had as students would often be deflated in light of a sometimes harsh reality of endless, long hours and of often harsh taskmasters who drove them with an unkind hand.
A significant part of this has to do with grabbing the students from the elite schools but the real goal was to grab the talented attorneys from each graduating class (this meant those from top schools and those from the top 10% or so of second-tier schools). The practice of law in such environments is truly demanding, and the goal was to find attorneys who worked hard, who knew how to think, and who comported themselves with the highest standards of discipline and excellence. Very few young attorneys can do all this consistently, and they are in great demand.
In one sense, however, this piece reads like it must have been written a couple of years ago. In reality, Big Law is still reeling from the latest economic collapse and the latest crop of 3Ls is still largely unemployed, with no serious prospects for improvement in sight for this particular labor market. Even the Harvard 3Ls have largely had to settle for the types of positions that, until recently, they would not even have begun to consider.
This truly is an artificial world and there is some doubt today whether it can continue to operate in its accustomed manner. Time will tell on this. I personally doubt it.
grellas, insightful post as always. Do you mind elaborating further on your last sentence/point?
There was an article earlier on HN about the growth of legal outsourcing in places like India, as well as the prevalence of four tiers of law schools overcrowding the marketplace. In your opinion, is the current state of the law labor market a reflection of recent economic shock, or do you think there is a paradigm shift occurring to some degree?
The recent economic collapse has caused a general revulsion against the billable fee structure that has been routinely used in large firms.
At their peak in 2008 before the collapse, fee structures had gotten to the point where first year associates were being billed at about $500 per hour, with senior associate rates reaching into $600/hr plus and partners ranging anywhere from $700 to $1,000/hr (even paralegals would be billed at as much as $350/hr plus, not to mention the summer clerks, who also would be billed at such rates).
Even more, the standard practice in such firms is to travel in packs. Several lawyers and a team of paralegals would be assigned to a typical project that comes to the firm and every one of them bills time on the matter whenever they talk to each other about it. Thus, a "team meeting" may wind up costing the client thousands of dollars per hour, as the lawyers and paralegals ruminate over the strategy of a case or the details of a discovery strategy, etc. Now it is not the norm to have everyone globally assembled even for a large matter, but even the routine, day-to-day handling of a matter winds up being double- or even triple-billed, e.g., a court hearing at which a partner shows up to do the argument with two associates in tow carrying the bags.
All in all, not a very efficient system. But, as noted in the article, there is an incestuous network in place between the big firms and the general counsel and other senior in-house counsel who effectively determine to which outside law firms they will farm out the company's most complex matters. Not only do the lawyers on the client have relationships with the big-firm lawyers but they also operate under the "I can't be fired for using IBM" principle - and this has led over the years to strong ties within this network that have assured a steady and growing stream of work for the big firms from the most prominent companies with the most complex legal needs, all in spite of any inefficiency in billing or even overt billing abuses.
For a while, when all was still well, these same in-house counsel, under pressure from management, began to assert themselves by questioning the overbillings, etc. and this led to a pattern by which initial billings in a matter became, in effect, akin to opening offers. Such billings would be scrutinized and returned with complaints about this or that, would be cut back, and would then be paid in what was generally regarded as still-inflated form.
The downturn did change all this, with companies having had enough of this billing model. In today's environment, the large firms have had to adapt and have been forced to temper the old abuses with reduced hourly rates, fixed-fee arrangement, caps, etc. It is still the same old machine but much humbled when it comes to routine billing matters involving the in-house network. Very large and very complex matters still command the old rates and the old multiple-billing mechanisms, and that is why large firms salivate over the prospect, e.g., of getting a prominent role in the Lehman bankruptcy or in defending a prominent class action, etc. The problem is that there are only so many matters of this type, and certainly not enough to support the range of large firms in the manner to which they had historically been accustomed.
Thus, today, the field is much more varied even for the larger legal matters that have traditionally gone to large firms. For discrete issues, such as complex discovery, much of the work is being outsourced, e.g., to the Indian companies you mention. Instead of having a team of U.S. lawyers and paralegals poring over millions of documents at rates of $500 and up, you have a much less expensive labor pool overseas doing this sort of mind-numbing work. You also have a proliferation of smaller, boutique firms throughout the country doing the same work as the larger firms generally do, by comparably qualified lawyers, at half the billing rates. Some are set up "virtually" to enable themselves to compete on price even more effectively. And, in response, as noted above, the big firms themselves are adapting and discounting rates, etc.
All this represents a major change from historical patterns. I would go so far as to say that it has left the large firms "reeling," if that term is not too strong.
Will it result in a paradigm shift? In some ways, no. The network upon which the large firms feed is firmly intact and it does not appear that anything will change the basic ways in which the work is generated for such firms, i.e., they will continue to get the prestige big-company work and this will continue to support the existing structures. To that extent, the downturn has basically caused a short-term shift in the relative bargaining power between the company clients and the large firms. I expect this will shift back over time because law more and more affects large companies, with ever-expanding government regulatory frameworks, etc. in place, not to mention ever-expanding theories of legal liability. In this sense, Big Law will continue to be a "growth" business, albeit one that is temporarily in a slump.
In other ways, yes, however. Modern technology has indeed transformed the way law works and it is far easier today for clients to find good law firms of varying types to compete for their projects. Thus, at this level (which certainly includes the bulk of the startup world), clients have a far broader range of choices and this means more competition among the lawyers and better billing arrangements for the clients. Clients in such cases do not need to put up with things such a double-billing, or paying extensively for the learning time of all those young attorneys who are part of the 3-to-1 ratio on which the Big Law model depends. In these respects, I think the change is permanent. Clients are more knowledgeable and the information is now out there to give them good choices. This will not change going forward and is a good thing from the client side.
The ultimate institutional constraint, though, that will continue to support the current system is the guild system under which lawyers operate. Owing to the force of the law regulating the field, one can only practice law in a jurisdiction in which one is licensed and one who is not licensed can't offer any form of legal services to the public. This system, though intended to be protective of clients, acts much as the old guilds of the middle ages did in making sure that only the licensed artisans get the work. This in turn creates artificial scarcity, leaves it impossible for enterprising people to solve legal problems through creative means, and generally leaves the client with fewer choices and little ability to bargain over price. As long as this system generally prevails, there will be no fundamental changes in the field.
Sorry to go on and on, but I do hope this helps give you an insight into the broader patterns in the field.
Very informative and interesting comment - thank you for "go[ing] on and on!"
It seems to me that the pattern you are describing also applies to Big 4 professional services firms like PriceWaterhouseCoopers, KPMG, etc, in areas anchored around accounting and auditing but characterised by an ever-expanding array of allied services. Would you care to comment on any nuances or differences particular to them as opposed to Big Law?
Both are attempting to take what were traditionally fairly sleepy service professions (this would be 50+ years ago) and transform them into worldwide mega-businesses for their respective niches. This means that the old partnership model has effectively died in both professions. Partners tend not to sign on for life with such a firm any longer but rather tend to align themselves more opportunistically with any given firm, ready to jump to another as opportunity and the dollars warrant. For this reason, too, the firms tend not to support partners over the long term and the loyalty factor is much diminished from what it used to be. In short, both are now major businesses, with all the upside and downside that comes with taking the risks of major entrepreneurial ventures.
Thus, as firms trying to expand aggressively into new fields, with worldwide operations, such firms are now subject to all the vagaries of major businesses. In the past, a major law firm or a major accounting firm would not have wild fluctuations in its firm operations - ups and downs, yes, but not wild swings that could threaten its survival. Today, both large law firms and major accounting firms have done the unthinkable: (1) systematically purging their partner ranks to weed out less productive partners, (2) mass layoffs of younger professionals to survive severe downturns, (3) firm explosions that have caused some of the premier firms to go out of business altogether (in accounting, Arthur Andersen, of course; in law, firms such as Heller Ehrman (which was a 150-year-old firm, Brobeck, etc.). These are all symptoms of the shift from staid profession to major business venture. Of course, the rewards of successful expansion have far exceeded the risks over the years, and have enabled such professionals to make returns on average per partner that easily dwarf what such partners used to make under the old ways and hence they have made this shift.
I don't think I am competent to comment on refined nuances between the large firms within the accounting profession versus the legal and so will leave that to others.
Yep, but "out" must be "somewhere"... I assume they don't leave the legal profession altogether. Management consultants up-or-outed usually become either independent hyper-specialists (e.g. one very narrow industry vertical they they can "own" as the expert[1]) or get hired into upper-middle management by former clients (and then turn around and hire their old firms).
[1] I know one guy whose speciality is labelling. Dude knows everything you could possibly want to know about "sticking labels on stuff" on an industrial scale, and that's how he makes his living, consulting on that.
Big firm life is not for everyone because the grind never ceases, even for those who are young partners. Therefore, many chose to leave just to preserve their sanity. Whether by choice or not, anyone who leaves after having done a reasonable stint at such firms historically has had an open ticket to all sorts of other premier jobs within the legal profession (prominent in-house positions, partnership at mid-sized firms, senior government positions, etc.). This is another reason why associates scramble so hard to land positions within the largest firms. In essence, once you have proved yourself there even at the earliest stages, you have an open ticket to do well in the field generally from that day forward. Of course, this is not automatic and must be accompanied by lots of hard work, etc. One thing that is almost guaranteed about such lawyers is that they are highly disciplined lawyers who take their careers seriously and who seek to excel at what they do.
I’m glad I’m not the only one bothered by this technicality. It seems everybody talking about how the American employment situation worked neglected to what degree individual employees could adapt to change. Economists always talk about how changes in technology or employment patterns have little long term impact, since a job pool will provide labor that is in demand, but “creative destruction” is not an instantaneous process, and the people hurt by it are the type of people that economists, politicians and business executives ignore, robbing them of the power needed to fix their situation.
Lawyers go work 'in-house'. i.e. large firms have in-house permanent counsel.
Being in house often means becoming the client of the firm you previously worked for, and suddenly you are the one calling the shots and getting invited to all the expensive dinners.
In-house seems (as a law outsider) a well paid alternative with very light workload.
It's a huge win for the employer of the in-house, too.
They can pay an in-house lawyer, say, $200,000 - $350,000/year to mostly not do a whole of anything, but handle all legal issues as needed when they do come up. They are also often allowed to quietly practice a little law on the side.
That's a whole lot cheaper than paying the retainer and billing rates of a firm for the same workload.
Law firms (at least in the UK, I imagine it is probably the same in the US) exist in a pretty well defined hierarchy - the "up or out" principle often works within this hierarchy as well.
Having said that - over the last couple of years a lot of lawyers in areas like commercial property have simply left the profession.
I worked at one such firm for five years, and did a lot of recruiting of undergraduates in that time. This is a mostly fair summary, but I take exception to the following:
Even getting an interview often requires attending an Ivy League professional school or a very few top tier equivalents
Anyone could apply. All applications were taken seriously, and I worked with several excellent people from non-Ivy-League schools. It would be much more accurate to say:
Even _knowing_ about such business consulting firms often requires attending an Ivy League professional school or a very few top tier equivalents
I always found this regrettable. It boils down to the fact that most undergraduates have never heard of most business consulting firms (or the industry at all), so a lot of work (consultants' time) and money go in to on-campus awareness marketing. That doesn't scale well at all. So we ended up doing it where we had the biggest bang for the buck (in the UK, this was just Cambridge and Hull... err, I mean Oxford). We would sometimes send one new hire to the careers fair at a few other universities.
Bottom line: anyone could apply; every application was taken seriously; 99% of students outside Oxbridge had never heard of us, and that was too expensive for us to fix.
This is true. I went to a state school and had never heard of management consulting until everyone I met from MIT went into it. I remember a dinner in Boston where I kept asking them, why would a company pay a 24 yr old with no experience for advice on anything? I still haven't heard a good explanation.
A shepherd was herding his flock in a remote pasture when suddenly a brand-new BMW advanced out of the dust cloud towards him. The driver, a young man in a Broni suit, Gucci shoes, Ray Ban sunglasses and YSL tie, leaned out the window and asked the shepherd... "If I tell you exactly how many sheep you have in your flock, will you give me one?" The shepherd looked at the man, obviously a yuppie, then looked at his peacefully grazing flock and calmly answered "sure".
The yuppie parked his car, whipped out his IBM ThinkPad and connected it to a cell phone, then he surfed to a NASA page on the internet where he called up a GPS satellite navigation system, scanned the area, and then opened up a database and an Excel spreadsheet with complex formulas. He sent an email on his Blackberry and, after a few minutes, received a response. Finally, he prints out a 130-page report on his miniaturized printer then turns to the shepherd and says, "You have exactly 1586 sheep. "That is correct; take one of the sheep." said the shepherd. He watches the young man select one of the animals and bundle it into his car.
Then the shepherd says: "If I can tell you exactly what your business is, will you give me back my animal?", "OK, why not." answered the young man. "Clearly, you are a consultant." said the shepherd. "That's correct." says the yuppie, "but how did you guess that?" "No guessing required." answers the shepherd. "You turned up here although nobody called you. You want to get paid for an answer I already knew, to a question I never asked, and you don't know crap about my business...... Now give me back my dog."
It might be one of those apocryphal engineering war stories, but one I've heard a few times: a consulting company is brought in by management with a pretty obvious goal of ratifying something management already wanted to do. The in-house engineers know what's going on, and what management wants ratified, but they're supposed to work with this consulting firm. The engineers at the consulting firm know that they're probably being asked to ratify some already-made decision, and their job is basically to find out what it is and recommend that. Early on, the in-house engineers just spill to the beans to the consulting firm's engineers, and both groups more or less take it easy for three months, short-circuiting the usual charade while management on both sides thinks that some sort of consulting dance is going on.
tl;dr The best chauffeur doesn't have to be the best driver, and consulting firms are not raw meritocracies.
I work at a McBain Group level consulting firm as one of the analysis-slaves. My colleagues hail from many different universities, but only around half are Ivy League, though all are first tier. There are 15 of us, whittled down from a field of around 3,000. In other words, for each position, they considered about 200 applications.
We might not be the best analyst, the best client negotiator, or the best excel wrangler, but in this industry those aren't the only things that are valued - the firm's profits aren't singularly tied to the strength of their recommendations. There's a certain amount of flash and pedigree that they need to justify billing out a 24 year old at $300 an hour. This isn't unique to consulting, but seems to get paraded around due to the amounts of money the position commands and the apparent inequity of taking the 'rich' and making them richer.
Think of your girlfriend/wife's hairdresser. Are they worth the $50-150 she pays them to cut their hair? Is that haircut really worth the %300 premium over supercuts or the corner store?
Based on the raw haircut of course not. But this stylist does Michelle Obama's hair, he has great gossiping skills, and the salon looks great. So she does it anyway.
There are tons of industries just like this. Why are there no ugly people in Hollywood? Why do Apple products command a premium? It's very similar to any other luxury good; you pay a lot for each incremental improvement.
Can you explain that "flash and pedigree" line? What is that? Is that basically having the right upper-middle-class background? Your next sentence seems to imply that it's related to the economic status of these 24 year olds.
If that's the case, as per your last paragraph, what's the incremental improvement that "flash and pedigree" provides?
Well honestly it's about backing up the $300/hr rate. the job of the consultant is to come in and quickly convince the client that they not only know what they are talking about but are experts at what they are talking about. In reality you've only read the wikipedia article and a few trade publications for background, but somehow you have to convince the client that you do, in fact, know your shit.
The flash and pedigree refers to one of the ways you can convince people of your expert knowledge. People tend to put more faith into a recommendation that comes out of a Harvard grad than others, even if the Harvard grad talks completely out of their ass (pedigree). Furthermore, if the client sees that other people, just like themselves, have been paying this Harvard grad to talk out of his ass, they figure he must be a good person to have (prestige).
So in essence, the high rate of consulting comes down to the ability to say 'but we have lots of Harvard/Princeton/Yale minds working on this!' and 'No one ever got fired for using IBM'.
ah, thanks! So it's the incremental improvement of a Harvard vs. a Cornell, or even a (gasp!) non-ivy. That makes sense, i suppose. I think I got confused because, as you acknowledge,
"We might not be the best analyst, the best client
negotiator, or the best excel wrangler,"
which suggests that they are not actually experts, right? I.e., school-choice and performance/ability are already divergent, but that's really not the point of the school.
So i guess, compared what some of the other posters here are saying, if you didn't go to a top-flight school, then you actually don't have a chance to get into these places, right?
I've been on the other side of this as a Wall Street trading intern. As a college senior in 2007, my future employer hosted a party in NYC for all those who had accepted their job offers. Keep in mind, this is for people who had already agreed to take the job -- not for potential candidates. Still, they flew us to NYC from our respective colleges, put us up in a really nice boutique hotel, reserved a very nice restaurant for the night, paid for our drinks, drove us around in limos, served us brunch, and flew us back to NYC the next day. It was totally outlandish.
Potential employers wine and dine their candidates because, well, that's how THEY would want to be treated if they were applying. Wall Streeters are quite status conscious, so of course they'll try to appeal to candidates' materialism and sense of status. Law firms are no different, though they're probably a bit more modest than your average investment bank.
It's the same thing as Google bragging about their massages and catered sushi. Google is just showing that they have what their candidates care about. Your average tech employee probably wouldn't care, and would maybe even be a little put off if their employer took them to an exclusive club. Wall Street banks are big on expensive dinners and bottle service, but many of them don't even have gyms or subsidized cafeterias, much less free food. My firm didn't even have napkins in the pantry!
I published a technical book at the age of 21. While I didn't make much money, the publisher (who has since been bought and sold 3 times I think) certainly wined and dined me at every conference and event that I went to. Great meals and all the free booze I could drink. Not to mention the chance to flirt with the always really attractive editors they sent out to work these things.
It sure made an impression on 21 year old me. There didn't seem to be a lot in it for the publisher (other than keeping their writers happy I suppose). It wasn't like my book was very successful. Hell it wasn't very good at all. At 21 I had the knowledge, but lacked the work-ethic to really put the time into it.
I always wonder if that's all this really is. Folks who have the money looking for an excuse to spend it (and make some kids year). I'm not sure it's a big plot to make them dependent on the job. I really think that people, generally, like to throw money around.
What you are also seeing there is HR departments competing with each other for rankings in "best graduate programme" tables in the press. Which they may be incentivized to do by their own bonus system.
I totally agree about Google - they are basically the same model as a law firm, highly talented fresh graduates working long hours, but with one glaring exception: it's still possible to be made partner in a law firm. Google isn't minting any more millionaires this long after its IPO.
I think it even works to some extent, even among people who don't officially care. Here in academia we're not supposed to care about materialism, and many people actively make an effort not to. But conference organizers still put in things like lavish conference banquets, not because they enjoy wasting money and raising already-high registration fees, but because they've noticed it seems to make a difference in what kind of paper submissions and attendance numbers they get. I'm not sure what part of it is cynical versus subliminal, but it seems to work either way. I imagine some professors actively like the opportunity to spend an extra $100 on "conference registration" if it means they get it back in an off-the-books lavish banquet, while others grumble at the extra $100 of their already-tight grant money being wasted. But either the latter category are outnumbered, or the wining-and-dining subconsciously works on them anyway, by making them remember the conference more positively. Possibly there's just something to lavish entertainment making people well disposed to you, even if they know that's what's going on.
A few random thoughts from long time lurker, first time commenter (I finally have some value / expertise to add): The biggest thing that these interviews are testing is structured assimilation. Banks look for someone who can convincingly discuss their unremitting passion to enter finance as a lifelong career without seeming either passionate or betraying an interest in the money. Consulting firms structure 'case interviews' designed to test 'problem solving' when they are really laying out a regimented structure which can be most easily mastered through having a successful network of already-hired junior consultants. Again, it's not that there isn't a desire to hire creative, talented people, but the profile has to fit along certain metrics.
I think it basically comes down to a status signaling mechanism. They are selling a dream to these candidates, so later they can sell these candidates to their clients. And selling is just that -- appearances. I doubt other schools don't have the candidates with the appropriate knowledge. However, I am sure, they do not have candidates that are in $200K+ student dept, and who expect to drive a Porsche bought with the signing bonus from their first job after college, who know the tastes of various types of caviar, and spend their vacations on private islands. One needs exactly these kind of people for your customers to interact with. They exude class, luxury, superiority, and confidence.
So it is about signaling a certain status position and it is about giving your client the best ass cover they can imagine. Anyone hiring these consultants can always point to them and say "Look, we had all the best people. If they can't solve the problem, nobody can". These firms tap into that market -- the market for golden scapegoats.
And the funny thing is, if the golden scapegoats fuck up, it is not a problem -- on the contrary, bonuses still roll in. The firm doesn't lose reputation. Because, after all, if these guys and gals can't do it, nobody can. The fuck-up is just a demonstration of impossibility of solving the particular problem.
It also depends on the firm's having the capacity to do highly sophisticated legal work while consistently adhering to standards of excellence.
Finally, it depends upon the firm's ability to induce the associates to adhere to wildly oppressive work hours as part of their normal schedule, such that, for example, when FB broadened its disclosure of user information there came popping out a whole series of attorneys who had (in the former cover of darkness) described themselves as "Slaves of xxx," or some variation thereof (which FB automatically designated as company names).
These firms will pay the associates anywhere from $165K/yr to start up to the high $200s, often with large bonuses tacked on to the base salary.
Why? Because it is basically a vast money-making machine for the partners who lead and manage those firms and who pull in multi-million dollar annual incomes. And the key to it is to have lots of talented bodies consistently pulling all-nighters on major pieces of litigation and major deals that such firms handle. Thus, whenever you read about a headline deal ("Skype to offer shares in IPO at $1B valuation"), you can assume that there is a small legal army at work in the background doing an orgy of billing.
For their part, the associates toil and slave in such systems for as much as 8 to 10 years in hopes of making partner so that they can one day be on the receiving end of this money-making machine.
This system works well only if highly talented young attorneys can consistently be recruited to handle the vast bulk of the billable hours involved in such work. Thus, the most precious asset belonging to such firms is precisely this pool of young talent, and they will pay dearly to get it. What is more, such associates are paid in lockstep, meaning that if one of these large firms "adjusts," the others will be quick to follow. For a nearly unbroken period over the past 25 years, those adjustments have consistently been upward. The craziness peaked in the bubble years of the late 1990s, during which the associates themselves set up "greedy associates" websites and compared notes on every dollar paid and every perk provided by their respective firms. Of course, if any firm began to be seen as out of step with what these young lawyers came to see as their entirely legitimate demands, this would be suicide for the firm involved because the top talent would no longer go there. Thus, one saw the spectacle of the most elite law partners in the nation cravenly bowing and scraping to green new grads, all for the purpose of continuing to curry favor with them for recruiting purposes.
It goes without saying, then, that the firms would easily shell out for the sorts of things described in this piece - for expensive and luxurious flights, hotel stays, cab fares, dinners out, etc. It was all part of the game, and not a particularly costly part given what the firms would ultimately derive from this labor-pool asset within their business models. During their summer internships, they would be wined and dined as law students and would be repeatedly told what a great place to work the firm was. Once recruited as associates after graduation, they were introduced to the "slave system" in spades, and the naive perceptions they had as students would often be deflated in light of a sometimes harsh reality of endless, long hours and of often harsh taskmasters who drove them with an unkind hand.
A significant part of this has to do with grabbing the students from the elite schools but the real goal was to grab the talented attorneys from each graduating class (this meant those from top schools and those from the top 10% or so of second-tier schools). The practice of law in such environments is truly demanding, and the goal was to find attorneys who worked hard, who knew how to think, and who comported themselves with the highest standards of discipline and excellence. Very few young attorneys can do all this consistently, and they are in great demand.
In one sense, however, this piece reads like it must have been written a couple of years ago. In reality, Big Law is still reeling from the latest economic collapse and the latest crop of 3Ls is still largely unemployed, with no serious prospects for improvement in sight for this particular labor market. Even the Harvard 3Ls have largely had to settle for the types of positions that, until recently, they would not even have begun to consider.
This truly is an artificial world and there is some doubt today whether it can continue to operate in its accustomed manner. Time will tell on this. I personally doubt it.