I mean, again, this is not a branch of cryptography I take especially seriously, but I'd assume that if you were defining any kind of new cipher, you'd want to avoid constructions that were known to have fatal flaws embedded in them.
Either way, I brought it up because the author brings this up in their paper, but doesn't seem to fully address the literature of the attack he's trying to defend again (I may have missed something, though).
It seems to me that LC4 key is essentially equivalent to RC4 state and thus RC4 early keystream bias does not apply as there is no key-expansion phase.
Edit to clarify: LC4 key has to be permutation of 36 elements, while RC4's state is bijection of 256 elements that is somehow construed from the byte-string key and the issue is in how this string->state transformation works (ie. you have to pump the function for >500 times to get unbiased output).
Either way, I brought it up because the author brings this up in their paper, but doesn't seem to fully address the literature of the attack he's trying to defend again (I may have missed something, though).