Every time I see the "guns can't beat tanks" observation, it's usually painfully misguided/oversimplified. I mention this not to justify some "blood of the tyrants" notion, but because it is fundamental misunderstandings of why militaries are the way they are that leave people wondering massive failures like those experienced in Vietnam and throughout the Middle East for the last 50 years occurred.
Tanks exist for a very specific reason in modern militaries; they are effective in combatting deeply entrenched or armored enemies. When the modern tank was conceived in WWI, trench warfare brought the conflict to a grinding halt, and a tanks were the solution. WWI was a ground war fought by regular militaries. Many modern conflicts are guerilla wars fought against irregular militaries. Guerilla forces do not control battlefronts at strategic positions that require armor to penetrate. Guerilla forces do not have emplacements that cannot be defeated with small arms. Guerilla forces do not field any armor of their own.
Likewise, most features of modern militaries that were developed to fight other nation-states prove nearly useless against irregular combatants. Aircraft strike buildings and armor that guerrilas don't have, or combatants that are indistinguishable from the general populace. Navies fight ships that guerrillas don't sail. Modern EWAR disables communications and technologies that guerrillas don't use. Such capability is lost upon an insurgent force. This misunderstanding is (in some ways) a bizarre sort of American exceptionalism, where we seem to think that the more expensive military will always win, despite the overwhelming evidence to that not being true.
Tanks exist for a very specific reason in modern militaries; they are effective in combatting deeply entrenched or armored enemies. When the modern tank was conceived in WWI, trench warfare brought the conflict to a grinding halt, and a tanks were the solution. WWI was a ground war fought by regular militaries. Many modern conflicts are guerilla wars fought against irregular militaries. Guerilla forces do not control battlefronts at strategic positions that require armor to penetrate. Guerilla forces do not have emplacements that cannot be defeated with small arms. Guerilla forces do not field any armor of their own.
Likewise, most features of modern militaries that were developed to fight other nation-states prove nearly useless against irregular combatants. Aircraft strike buildings and armor that guerrilas don't have, or combatants that are indistinguishable from the general populace. Navies fight ships that guerrillas don't sail. Modern EWAR disables communications and technologies that guerrillas don't use. Such capability is lost upon an insurgent force. This misunderstanding is (in some ways) a bizarre sort of American exceptionalism, where we seem to think that the more expensive military will always win, despite the overwhelming evidence to that not being true.