I think Rosling would argue it differently. It's not a problem of "science communication", because there is no way to spin plain facts, hypotheses, and theory refinement in a way to make it automatically palatable to someone who doesn't want to believe it. (fwiw, I think Factfulness is the most valuable and important book I've read in at least a decade, and I recommend it to everyone.)
Rosling points out that smart, well-educated, well-meaning people who believe in science also see the world incorrectly - so incorrectly that they perform worse than random chance on multiple-choice questions. That's fascinating, and it suggests the problem is far more fundamental than "science communication". When facts are at odds with our instincts or cultural biases, we tend to choose the instincts and biases.
Rosling points out that smart, well-educated, well-meaning people who believe in science also see the world incorrectly - so incorrectly that they perform worse than random chance on multiple-choice questions. That's fascinating, and it suggests the problem is far more fundamental than "science communication". When facts are at odds with our instincts or cultural biases, we tend to choose the instincts and biases.