This has been freaking me out lately. I am trying to form a model of how a society would typically evolve past this situation and continue to advance and spread while maintaining humane and truly representative systems of government. So far I haven't come up with anything good.
But it is a singularity. We don't know what is on the other side. Or if there even is another side.
We are stumbling backwards into a world where a real video of a politician committing a crime in a private setting is indistinguishable from a fake one, but a citizen is 100% liable for actions captured on a government-sanctioned CCTV camera and cryptographically signed with a secret key.
I think it would be interesting to start a company around the idea of creating a certificate authority and system for provisioning and securely storing keys on a hardware level in order to sign and verify "unmodified" footage.
This would need to work both online and offline and thus require a form of device-unique secure enclave.
Offline is 2 layers of verification, your own keys and the on-device keys. Online is 3 layers of verification, those 2 keys plus a one-time key provided ad-hoc by a certificate server.
This means that users could maintain higher journalistic integrity with a video captured while online, as it could be argued that even if the device key is compromised the server-issued key would still provide some level of trust that the video is undoctored.
If this sounds of interest to anyone, get in touch.
> I think it would be interesting to start a company around the idea of creating a certificate authority and system for provisioning and securely storing keys on a hardware level in order to sign and verify "unmodified" footage.
This is also described in (if I remember correctly) "The player of games" where videos were widely known as impossible to trust due to how easy it is to make fakes, but AI entities could testify that they received the realtime, live feed if you needed a proof.
But it is a singularity. We don't know what is on the other side. Or if there even is another side.
We are stumbling backwards into a world where a real video of a politician committing a crime in a private setting is indistinguishable from a fake one, but a citizen is 100% liable for actions captured on a government-sanctioned CCTV camera and cryptographically signed with a secret key.
I think it would be interesting to start a company around the idea of creating a certificate authority and system for provisioning and securely storing keys on a hardware level in order to sign and verify "unmodified" footage.
This would need to work both online and offline and thus require a form of device-unique secure enclave.
Offline is 2 layers of verification, your own keys and the on-device keys. Online is 3 layers of verification, those 2 keys plus a one-time key provided ad-hoc by a certificate server.
This means that users could maintain higher journalistic integrity with a video captured while online, as it could be argued that even if the device key is compromised the server-issued key would still provide some level of trust that the video is undoctored.
If this sounds of interest to anyone, get in touch.