> Though society is not founded on a contract, and though no good purpose is answered by inventing a contract in order to deduce social obligations from it, every one who receives the protection of society owes a return for the benefit, and the fact of living in society renders it indispensable that each should be bound to observe a certain line of conduct towards the rest.
> This conduct consists, first, in not injuring the interests of one another; or rather certain interests, which, either by express legal provision or by tacit understanding, ought to be considered as rights; and secondly, in each person’s bearing his share (to be fixed on some equitable principle) of the labours and sacrifices incurred for defending the society or its members from injury and molestation.
> These conditions society is justified in enforcing, at all costs to those who endeavour to withhold fulfilment. Nor is this all that society may do. The acts of an individual may be hurtful to others, or wanting in due consideration for their welfare, without going to the length of violating any of their constituted rights. The offender may then be justly punished by opinion, though not by law.
> As soon as any part of a person’s conduct affects prejudicially the interests of others, society has jurisdiction over it, and the question whether the general welfare will or will not be promoted by interfering with it, becomes open to discussion.
> But there is no room for entertaining any such question when a person’s conduct affects the interests of no persons besides himself, or needs not affect them unless they like (all the persons concerned being of full age, and the ordinary amount of understanding). In all such cases, there should be perfect freedom, legal and social, to do the action and stand the consequences.
> It would be a great misunderstanding of this doctrine to suppose that it is one of selfish indifference, which pretends that human beings have no business with each other’s conduct in life, and that they should not concern themselves about the well-doing or well-being of one another, unless their own interest is involved. Instead of any diminution, there is need of a great increase of disinterested exertion to promote the good of others. But disinterested benevolence can find other instruments to persuade people to their good than whips and scourges, either of the literal or the metaphorical sort. I am the last person to undervalue the self-regarding virtues; they are only second in importance, if even second, to the social.
I cannot imagine what the other people in this thread think he wrote to respond as if it supports their idea of society not having authority over policing harmful conduct.
> Like other tyrannies, the tyranny of the majority was at first, and is
still vulgarly, held in dread, chiefly as operating through the acts of the public authorities. But reflecting persons perceived that when society is itself the tyrant—society collectively over the separate individuals who compose it—its means of tyrannising are not restricted to the acts which it may do by the hands of its political functionaries. Society can and does execute its own mandates: and if it issues wrong mandates instead of right, or any mandates at all in things with which it ought not to meddle, it practises a social tyranny more formidable than many kinds of political oppression, since, though not usually upheld by such ex- treme penalties, it leaves fewer means of escape, penetrating much more deeply into the details of life, and enslaving the soul itself. Protection, therefore, against the tyranny of the magistrate is not enough: there needs protection also against the tyranny of the prevailing opinion and feeling; against the tendency of society to impose, by other means than civil penalties, its own ideas and practices as rules of conduct on those who dissent from them; to fetter the development, and, if possible, prevent the formation, of any individuality not in harmony with its ways, and compels all characters to fashion themselves upon the model of its own. There is a limit to the legitimate interference of collective opinion with individual independence: and to find that limit, and maintain it against encroachment, is as indispensable to a good condition of human affairs, as protection against political despotism.
I think this quote is equally applicable to what is happening with our new cancel culture.
I tried to quote as much as possible because basically every paragraph hedges the former. This is the paragraph that immediately follows yours:
> But though this proposition is not likely to be contested in general terms, the practical question, where to place the limit—how to make the fitting adjustment between individual independence and social control— is a subject on which nearly everything remains to be done.
> All that makes existence valuable to any one, depends on the enforcement of restraints upon the actions of other people. Some rules of conduct, therefore, must be imposed, by law in the first place, and by opinion on many things which are not fit subjects for the operation of law.
It seems pretty clear that absolute free speech is absolutely off the table. We can agree that the pendulum has swung too far, without spiking it in the other direction.
> It seems pretty clear that absolute free speech is absolutely off the table.
Actually, speech is probably the one area that actually realizes Mill's otherwise unrealistic ideal case for when society should have no jurisdiction over individual action:
"when a person’s conduct affects the interests of no persons besides himself, or needs not affect them unless they like (all the persons concerned being of full age, and the ordinary amount of understanding)"
Mere speech cannot affect the interests of anyone: words are not magic spells. So by Mill's logic, society should indeed have no jurisdiction over speech--absolute free speech should not be off the table.
Coercion and fraud are not speech. More generally, verbal statements that are part of other actions, such as negotiations for a market transaction, are not speech. The whole point of "speech" is that it is just expressing the beliefs or opinions of the speaker.
One almost never expresses speech for no ulterior motive. Speech is almost always purposeful, and when it concerns beliefs or policy (and it does more than one may think), it is an action intended to influence the political process, ie, how things are done. Not that I disagree that speech should be free, but I think the distinction that was made is fairly absurd and lacks realism.
> One almost never expresses speech for no ulterior motive.
Depends on what you mean by "ulterior motive". If it's just speech, it is an expression of belief or opinion, as I said, and that is all it is. Everyone who hears it can judge it for themselves solely as an expression of belief or opinion. If it's a belief or opinion about public policy, any honest motive for expressing it will be part of the speech itself, so it won't be an "ulterior" motive in the sense of being hidden.
If it is not evident what a person's motives are for expressing a belief or opinion about public policy, any sane hearer will take that fact into account when judging the speech. If the hearer is not being given the freedom to make such judgments, then we're not talking about speech any more, we're talking about coercion or fraud.
> when it concerns beliefs or policy (and it does more than one may think), it is an action intended to influence the political process
No, it's an action intended to influence other people--but whether it does or not depends on the merits of what is said. Speech by itself can't change the political process; that requires changing the Constitution or laws.
> I think the distinction that was made is fairly absurd and lacks realism.
I think it is absurd and lacks realism to refuse to recognize the distinction between speech and action. The whole point of having the category "speech" at all is to force people to accept the reality that, if you want to live in a free country, you have to be enough of a mature adult to be able to tolerate people expressing beliefs that you think are false and opinions that you abhor. In a free country, the proper response to speech you think is wrong is more speech to refute or rebut the speech you think is wrong. Once the idea takes hold that it's okay to suppress people just because they say things you think are wrong, we no longer have a free country. Talk about "ulterior motives" is really just another way of suppressing people who say things you think are wrong.
It’s also worth noting that cancel culture itself arose because a different “prevailing opinion” was creating different problems. In every case, whichever group ends up in the lead makes things hard for the other groups
> This conduct consists, first, in not injuring the interests of one another; or rather certain interests, which, either by express legal provision or by tacit understanding, ought to be considered as rights; and secondly, in each person’s bearing his share (to be fixed on some equitable principle) of the labours and sacrifices incurred for defending the society or its members from injury and molestation.
> These conditions society is justified in enforcing, at all costs to those who endeavour to withhold fulfilment. Nor is this all that society may do. The acts of an individual may be hurtful to others, or wanting in due consideration for their welfare, without going to the length of violating any of their constituted rights. The offender may then be justly punished by opinion, though not by law.
> As soon as any part of a person’s conduct affects prejudicially the interests of others, society has jurisdiction over it, and the question whether the general welfare will or will not be promoted by interfering with it, becomes open to discussion.
> But there is no room for entertaining any such question when a person’s conduct affects the interests of no persons besides himself, or needs not affect them unless they like (all the persons concerned being of full age, and the ordinary amount of understanding). In all such cases, there should be perfect freedom, legal and social, to do the action and stand the consequences.
> It would be a great misunderstanding of this doctrine to suppose that it is one of selfish indifference, which pretends that human beings have no business with each other’s conduct in life, and that they should not concern themselves about the well-doing or well-being of one another, unless their own interest is involved. Instead of any diminution, there is need of a great increase of disinterested exertion to promote the good of others. But disinterested benevolence can find other instruments to persuade people to their good than whips and scourges, either of the literal or the metaphorical sort. I am the last person to undervalue the self-regarding virtues; they are only second in importance, if even second, to the social.
I cannot imagine what the other people in this thread think he wrote to respond as if it supports their idea of society not having authority over policing harmful conduct.