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> At some point, someone somewhere has to have access to infrastructure

They could run everything in Nitro Enclaves or similar, that require multiple people to deterministically compile and sign new software for, and release secrets into.

I design quorum controlled infrastructure for a living, mostly in fintech where no single human can ever be trusted. You 100% can run infrastructure that, barring a platform 0day, can prevent any single human from having access to the memory of customer workloads and secrets. Customers likewise would encrypt any secrets or code directly to keys that only exist in the enclaves.

CircleCI had negligent security design, but all its competitors are just as bad, to be fair.

Building with security in mind makes you last to market, which is unforgivable in our industry. Getting hacked however is just considered a cost of doing business.



> CircleCI had negligent security design, but all its competitors are just as bad, to be fair.

Ominous. What about GitHub? The amount of secrets I trust them with is practically all my life force at this point.


There is no evidence GitHub has any multi-party accountability for sysadmins or enclaves for secret management. You enter secrets into the GitHub Web UI in plaintext, which means at least some employees can access them in plaintext.

GitHub/NPM have historically failed to support supply chain integrity practices in their public offerings such as hardware anchored code signing, signed code reviews, reproducible builds, multi-party approvals, etc. It is reasonable to expect they are not doing any of that internally either.

Assume any secret you give GitHub will become public knowledge and act accordingly.

The good news is there is never a reason to trust a VCS or CI system with high value secrets. They should never ever need any power beyond running tests, accessing a test environment, or sending notifications.




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