Basically, cryptography requires a PRNG whose output is provably indistinguishable from a true RNG. Your algorithm cannot be proven to have this property, and might even be susceptible to some attacks.
Basically, it's a band-aid, but cryptography is rigorous and averse to band-aids, requiring everything to be mathematically proven before use.
It's not enough for an algorithm to "seem reasonable", it must be mathematically proven to have certain properties. It's really an extremely interesting subject to study, I'd give it a go. Join the coursera class on cryptography.
Basically, it's a band-aid, but cryptography is rigorous and averse to band-aids, requiring everything to be mathematically proven before use.
To be honest, I am quite partial to the description of modern economics given by George Soros, namely: the entire thing is based on a false analogy with Newtonian physics.
This is the proverbial 'false sense of security', lent credence by its ... ubiquity ... in the field. Perhaps sometimes mathematicians in general take a not wholly dissimilar bent in their reasoning; ie. they think that because something is proven in a mathematical sense using their current knowledge of viable routes of deducation that it remains 'true' and unassailable.
The threat of someone else having or coming up with a faster physical or logical method of deduction does threaten these assumptions.
The broader goal, then, is not to trust a single PRNG algorithm, or, if possible, branch of mathematics (I am not skilled in that area but heard Pythagorean vs. Elliptic Curve mentioned). I am positing that this level of paranoia is, whilst computationally and resource-wise somewhat more costly, probably a good idea, and that the example of the present article is a good one that demonstrates the efficacy of this line of thinking.
The secondary route of side-channel attacks is also hampered by this strategy, since arbitrary entropy sources (potential side channels) may be (re)assigned to arbitrary PRNG algorithms running in parallel at any time.
> they think that because something is proven in a mathematical sense using their current knowledge of viable routes of deducation that it remains 'true' and unassailable.
That's because it does.
> The threat of someone else having or coming up with a faster physical or logical method of deduction does threaten these assumptions.
No, it doesn't, because there are no assumptions.
> The broader goal, then, is not to trust a single PRNG algorithm, or, if possible, branch of mathematics.
No, if you don't trust something, use something you do trust. The change you're proposing has more potential to do harm than good, e.g. render nine perfectly good PRNGs broken just because you mixed them with one broken one. If you had only used one PRNG, your adversary had to break that PRNG, but, now that you used ten, he only has to break the weakest one, so you've made things much easier for him.
> whilst computationally and resource-wise somewhat more costly, probably a good idea.
Nope, it probably isn't.
> In summary: hedge thy bets.
In summary, the entire crypto community is smarter than you (or me), and any improvement you (or I) think might work has probably been proven hopelessly broken a thousand times over. There's a reason people use a single PRNG, and the reason is that, when your PRNG's output is provably indistinguishable from true randomness, messing with it will certainly not improve it, and will probably ruin it.
(Edit as can't reply to child: Sure, but this gets back to the mathematical analysis does not equal real world proof, since we do not know all possible computational (or side channel!) vectors. Assertion otherwise is reminiscent of Socrates: οὖτος μὲν οἴεταί τι εἰδέναι οὐκ εἰδώς, ἐγὼ δέ, ὥσπερ οὖν οὐκ οἶδα, οὐδὲ οἴμαι This man, on one hand, believes that he knows something, while not knowing [anything]. On the other hand, I – equally ignorant – do not believe [that I know anything].https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/I_know_that_I_know_nothing ... OK that's weak, but honestly that's how I tend to think (ie. with great cynicism about any assertion) and it serves me alright in general security / non-cryptographic discourse. Basically this approach is treating the PRNG algorithm as a black box, refusing to trust it, and attempting to design a system incorporating the black box along with others claiming the same functionality, based upon that assumption. If this works for any other algorithm - and it seems to - then why not PRNGs? It's not like cryptography has a monopoly as an arbiter of risk. Cryptography is not a silver bullet.)
> and the reason is that, when your PRNG's output is provably indistinguishable from true randomness, messing with it will certainly not improve it, and will probably ruin it.
Basically, it's a band-aid, but cryptography is rigorous and averse to band-aids, requiring everything to be mathematically proven before use.
It's not enough for an algorithm to "seem reasonable", it must be mathematically proven to have certain properties. It's really an extremely interesting subject to study, I'd give it a go. Join the coursera class on cryptography.